INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution provides, in part, that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 3 This "Privileges or Immunities Clause" has been called "the darling of the professoriate." 4 Indeed, in the last decade alone, law professors have published dozens of articles treating the provision. 5 This Article proceeds from the same professorial ardor. Still, relative to many other treatments, this Article is both more modest and more ambitious. On the one hand, I do not propose to offer a full account of the original meaning of the Clause. On the other, I do aim to help build a genuine scholarly consensus by presenting compelling evidence that has been, for the most part, largely overlooked by contemporary scholars. 6 The focus of this particular study is the interpretation of the "privileges and immunities of citizens" offered by American political actors, including not only judges, but also elected officials and private citizens, before the Fourteenth Amendment, and primarily, on the eve of the Civil War. This study proceeds in four parts.
First, the Article defends the relevance of this inquiry. I am to refute the conclusion of Justice Miller and (more recently) of Justice Thomas that the "privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states" secured by Article IV were generally understood to be sharply distinct from the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the authors of the Clause largely believed that it would provide greater security to the privileges guaranteed in Article IV.
Second, the Article provides a brief account of the understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause before 1857, concluding that the provi- 6 Some of the evidence presented here is now much more readily available to scholars, thanks to the explosive growth of scanned text, especially via Google Books and other sources of "big data." sion's original understanding was ambiguous and generated only sporadic (though important) national controversy and commentary. As a result, up to 1857, the Privilege and Immunities Clause's meaning remained largely obscure, even among jurists.
Third, the Article explains that from 1857 to 1861, in the course of national debates, at least three contrasting interpretations rose to substantial public prominence: (1) a pro-slavery, absolute-rights reading; (2) an absolute-rights reading endorsed by Republicans, which sometimes incorporated claims of black citizenship; and (3) a strictly interstate-equality understanding. The prominence of the first two readings represented radical developments relative to the third reading, a reading that had prevailed in the past and would prevail again in courts in the future. Consequently, there arose a substantial gap between the judiciary and the polity as a whole as to the meaning of the constitutional privileges of citizenship.
Fourth, this Article concludes by noting the ways in which this antebellum evidence illuminates both (1) the original understanding of the "privileges [and] immunities of citizens of the United States" 7 secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) the vulnerability of this Amendment to judicial misconstruction in the Slaughter-House Cases. 8 
I. THE IDENTITY OF THE "PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES" SECURED BY ARTICLE IV OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
According to Justice Miller's majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, the privileges guaranteed by Article IV are sharply distinct from those secured by the Fourteenth Amendment: the former involve the rights granted and established by the laws of the respective states, while the latter are rights created by federal law, including the Federal Constitution. 9 In McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Clarence Thomas, with express reliance on the work of Professor Kurt Lash, made a comparable claim. 10 If Justices Miller and Thomas are right, a consideration of the antebellum understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause would seem merely peripheral, only remotely relevant to an inquiry into the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.
citizens of the United States." 26 A year later, Virginia's governor Henry Wise reassured a Massachusetts abolitionist that she had a right to travel in Virginia because Article IV "guaranties to you the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States in the State of Virginia" including the right to travel "for any lawful and peaceful purpose." 27 Some antebellum jurists used similar language to explain the Clause. One authority was Charles O'Conor, one of the most celebrated attorneys in New York (and future presidential candidate and counsel for Jefferson Davis) . 28 Having been hired by the Virginia legislature to defend the interests of a Virginia slaveowner sojourning in New York, 29 O'Conor argued that the Clause protected "the privileges of citizens of the United States"-that is, not "the privileges of citizens of the particular State in which they are wayfarers, or of the State in which they are domiciled, but the general privileges of a citizen of the United States." 30 In Dred Scott v. Sandford, both Chief Justice Taney and Justice Nelson suggested a similar reading. 31 Other prominent northern jurists likewise affirmed that Article IV secured the privileges of national citizenship. While Congress was drafting the Fourteenth Amendment, Indiana's Supreme Court followed Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott 32 by calling these rights the "privileges and immunities of general citizenship of the United States." 33 Perhaps most notably, two decades earlier, Justice Nathaniel Reed, of Ohio's Supreme Court, had interpreted the Clause to read as follows: "That 'the citizens (of the United States) of each State,' or belonging to each State, 'shall be entitled to all the privi- . In response, William Evarts (future Republican Attorney General of the United States) contested this distinction: "the natural and necessary construction of the clause is, that the privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State, while within another, are the privileges and immunities that citizens of the State, where such privileges and immunities shall need to be claimed, enjoy," or in other words "the privileges and immunities (whatever they may be) accorded in each to its own citizens." 31 60 U.S. 393, 425 (1857) (stating that if a free black person had been a "citizen" under Article IV, "he might have visited and sojourned in Maryland when he pleased, and as long as he pleased, as a citizen of the United States" (emphasis added)); id. at 468 (Nelson, J., concurring) (raising the possible "right of the master with his slave of transit into or through a free State . . . being a citizen of the United States, which is not before us" which issue "turns upon the rights and privileges secured to a common citizen of the republic").
32 Id. at 576 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 33 Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 305 (1866).
leges and immunities of citizens (of the United States) in the several States.'" 34 According to Reed, the Clause protected certain national privileges throughout the Union: "the spirit and intention" of the Clause is "not to secure to the non-resident the same rights and indulgence with the resident in every State, but simply to secure to the citizen of the United States, whether a State resident or not, the full enjoyment of all the rights of citizenship, in every State throughout the Union." 35 Not surprisingly, it was Ohioans in Congress who two decades later would most prominently endorse this "ellipsis" reading. 36 For antebellum authorities, the Privileges and Immunities Clause protected the rights of "United States" citizenship in at least two ways. First, some explained that the Clause established a national status by naturalizing the citizens of each state in all the others. 37 Second, some thought the Clause secured national privileges because citizens of each of the states did enjoy them, and/or should enjoy them, in all the states of the Union. 38 This latter definition excluded those privileges of citizenship, such as political rights, that the states properly reserved to their own citizens-the privileges of state citizenship. 39 The qualifier "of the United States," then, served to clarify that the Clause did not secure all the privileges of citizenship, but only those of national extent.
In none of these ways did the word "United States" refer to the government of the United States as a creator of rights. As both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution indicate, the sovereign citizenry of the United States is a creator, not a creature, of the central government of the "United States." 40 The citizens of the United States, armed with their privileges, created the (mere) government of the United States. Justice Miller, however, reversed this relationship 41 To support Miller's contra-textual distinction, Justice Thomas pointed to the antebellum treaties in which the United States pledged to admit the inhabitants of the ceded Louisiana, Florida, and Mexican territories to the privileges of citizens of the United States. 42 According to Thomas, these territorial provisions were generally thought to protect certain privileges arising under national, not state law, including the rights enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights, as distinct from the state-conferred privileges protected in Article IV. These national rights, they argue, were the privileges of citizenship to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 43 The major problem with this reading is twofold. First, there is little to no direct evidence that anyone involved in the adoption of the Amendment understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause in this way. That is to say, there is scant record of anyone drawing a connection with the territorial rights, let alone elaborating that the Amendment would turn the treaty rights, secured in only some territories, into constitutional rights, guaranteed in all the states. 44 Second, this interpretation of the treaties is starkly inconsistent with the predominant antebellum interpretations. The original intent of the Louisiana and Florida treaties was to ensure that the inhabitants would not remain indefinitely in a subordinate status, but enjoy admission as citizens of an 783-90 (1985) .
44 Professors Lash and Green cite a few connections between the Amendment and the territorial treaties in 1866, but these related to the Citizenship Clause (or its analogue in the Civil Rights Act) and not to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. GREEN, supra note 20, at 24-25; LASH, supra note 43, at 142-43, 186-87. equal state of the Union. 45 The Clause, then, secured the inhabitants the collective right of "equal footing" as citizens of an equal state, 46 with collective naturalization extended concurrently with statehood. 47 In the four decades before the Fourteenth Amendment, this original interpretation was significantly modified, as litigants, judges, and statesmen increasingly insisted that the treaties granted not eventual, collective statehood and concomitant naturalization, but immediate, pre-statehood rights, including the enjoyment of the status and rights of citizenship. 48 The treaties were increasingly read to admit individuals to certain privileges of citizenship-and these were to be enjoyed before and even after statehood. By implication, the treaties did not promise "equal footing" but subjected the states formed from these territories to special, unequal restrictions.
In identifying these individual rights, authorities did not generally distinguish them from Article IV privileges. Rather, the rights mentioned were largely identical. According to various antebellum authorities, these privi- leges included the right to acquire real as well as personal property, 49 the immunity against arbitrarily discriminatory taxation and other unequal burdens on property-including discriminations based on race and national origin 50 -and that equal protection and due process necessary to the equal enjoyment of these economic privileges. 51 These rights may have also 49 Tannis v. Doe, 21 Ala. 449, 455 (1852) (mentioning the right "to hold lands in the United States"); United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. 422, 434 (1869) (mentioning the right of Indians "to hold, purchase, or convey property as citizens and as men, without having to ask the sanction of any department of the government"); Ward v. Broadwell, 1 N.M. 75, 85 (1854) (identifying "the power of enjoying and acquiring property, of exercising the paternal and marital powers and the like"); B.F. Flanders, Chairman, Address of the State Republican Convention to the People of Louisiana (Sept. 25, 1865), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF LOUISIANA 20 (1865) (including the right to engage in "every trade and pursuit"); cf. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. 525, 535-39 (1855) (indicating that the "privileges of citizenship" included the right to take and hold real property).
50 People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232, 242, 250-51 (1850) (upholding a special mining tax imposed on aliens and indicating that both the treaty and Article IV might prohibit such a tax on citizens naturalized under the Treaty); United States v. Santistevan, 1 N.M. 583, 591 (1874) (affirming that the treaty entitled former Mexican citizens to "the same rights of property as are enjoyed by all citizens of the United States"); JAMES MCKAYE, THE MASTER-SHIP AND ITS FRUITS 13 (1864) (noting that under the treaty, "the free colored people of Louisiana have always held, and do now claim, that the government of the United States was solemnly bound to secure to them 'all the rights, advantages, and immunities' that were justly due to any other free inhabitants of the ceded territory" including "political and many civil rights and immunities"); Flanders, supra note 49, at 19-20 (declaring that "[t]he repressive influence of slaves prevented the full application of this article [of the Louisiana treaty]" and indicating that these rights included the right to testify in all civil and criminal cases, and the right to engage in "every trade and pursuit"). But see Lodano v. State, 25 Ala. 64, 65-67 (1854) (implicitly rejecting defendant counsel's argument that by the Louisiana treaty, free black inhabitants had the same right as white inhabitants to buy and sell alcohol); Tannis, 21 Ala. at 455 (stating that a free black woman, naturalized under the treaty, would be entitled to the right to acquire property, "if not incapacitated by the laws of the State in which the lands were situated," thus suggesting the validity of state laws imposing racial disabilities (emphasis added)).
51 Les Bois v. Bramell, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 449, 459 (1846) (acknowledging that the promise of admission to the rights of U.S. citizenship "implied, that after their admission they should be equally protected" (emphasis added)); Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 376, 403 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (affirming that the former aliens had "the same constitutional right to invoke the protection of the judicial power of the state or Union, against the invasion of his rights of person or property, wherever he might be located" and asking rhetorically, "can the inhabitants enjoy the rights, privileges, and immunities of American citizens, if the United States can confiscate their lands, by declaring their titles void, and granting them to others; and could this be done after their incorporation?" (emphasis added)); Delassus v. United States, 34 U.S. 117, 133 (1835) (including "the perfect inviolability and security of property"); Minturn v. Brower, 24 Cal. 644, 660 (1864) (affirming that by the treaty "Mexicans then established in California, and having property therein, should retain and enjoy it or dispose of it as to them might seem proper" and assuming this guaranty applied to a post-statehood claim of former Mexicans naturalized by the treaty); Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 620 (1858) (indicating former encompassed the right to vote (and other political rights) without regard to race. 52 These rights, including the possible enjoyment of political rights, were largely identical to the enumerated privileges set forth in that most famous antebellum exposition of the Privileges and Immunities Clause-Corfield v. Coryell. 53 Therefore, in general, in the decades before the Civil War, there was largely a convergence in the interpretations of the respective "privileges and immunities" secured by the treaties and Article IV (according to Corfield).
II. "THAT [LARGELY] UNEXPLORED CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION"

A. Original Purpose and Early Interpretations-The Founders' Consensus
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution (and its analogue in the Articles of Confederation) generated little commentary during the Founding era. 54 This silence probably resulted from the conservative, and thus uncontroversial, nature of the measure. Upon independence, the lack of a common king, empire, and subjecthood had threatened to make the former fellow-subjects effectively aliens vis-à-vis one another. The principal motive for the Clause was to ensure that despite the mutual independence of the states, the citizens of each would still enjoy a general citizenship throughout the Union-the former British North America. 55 One question left largely unanswered was whether the standard of citizenship would be national or peculiar to each state. The Clause did not specify whether the privileges of citizenship were to be identified and/or defined with reference to a state, national, or other standard.
As I have previously noted, the early court decisions supported at least three different interpretations: (1) an interstate-equality guaranty by which a citizen of one state was entitled in the other states to an immunity against Mexican citizens "are entitled to the same protection in their property which is afforded to other citizens of the United States").
52 Carter v. Territory, 1 N.M. 317, 340-46 (1859) (noting that a Mexican-born citizen was an eligible juror by force of the treaty). For extrajudicial evidence, see MCKAYE, supra note 50, at 13, Flanders, supra note 49, at 18-20 (suggesting that the rights of U.S. citizenship included an immunity from racial discrimination with regard to judicial and electoral rights), and CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 286 (1865) (remarks of Pennsylvania Rep. Kelley, arguing for black suffrage in the reconstructed South, in part, by citing the treaty, and noting that full citizenship, including equal voting rights, was required by the "solemn obligations assumed by the executive department of the national Government in the exercise of the treaty-making power"). interstate discrimination; (2) an entitlement to certain national privileges of citizenship-primarily those travel and economic privileges enumerated in Corfield; and (3) an entitlement to certain privileges against adverse federal action. 56 The first position is largely identical to the interpretation that has prevailed at least since the Slaughter-House Cases. 57 Still, in the first three decades of the Constitution, jurists appeared largely unconcerned by the possible tensions between these positions. The reason for this insouciance is probably, as Earl Maltz has indicated, that the Founders expected the several states, in their local laws, to accord their own citizens the same set of fundamental rights: "the idea of a state government failing to provide its own citizens generally with the rights discussed in Corfield was almost unthinkable." 58 That is to say, there would likely be little distinction between the privileges of citizens of the United States and those of citizens in the respective states.
Indeed, at the risk of overstatement, it could be fairly said that at the founding, a general consensus as to the rights of humanity and citizenship prevailed, as evidenced in the state constitutions, the common law, and its privileges, would prevail across the several states without major controversy.
B. Emerging Strains to the Consensus
But the Founders' consensus was fraught with ambiguities resulting from the institution of slavery. These ambiguities gave rise to multiple controversies; some involved the interstate privileges of citizenship under our national Constitution. As the historian Albert Hart noted a century ago, two questions emerged as the northern states abolished slavery. First, "did the clause on 'privileges and immunities of citizens' give a master a right to carry his slaves into another state?" Second, " [d] id it give negro citizens in one state the right to go into another state?" 62 Further, in the 1830s, a third controversy emerged as northern antislavery speech became more strident and southern proslavery citizens became less tolerant: Did the Clause allow antislavery citizens the right to travel in the slaveholding states and even communicate their opinions therein? These three questions would forcibly awaken the dormant issue of whether the standard of "privileges and immunities" would be national or local.
Right of Slave Transit and Sojourning Slaveholders
In the first half of the nineteenth century, some traveling slaveholders sought judicial relief against increasingly intolerant northern antislavery laws. One constitutional argument was that the Privileges and Immunities Clause secured to sojourning slaveholders a right to travel with their slaves and thus an exemption from local antislavery law. The argument itself was remarkable in its novelty, given that the Framers of the Constitution had deliberately omitted such constitutional protection. 63 Even more remarkable was the argument's success. Before the 1850s, the supreme courts of Virginia, 64 Missouri, 65 , superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV ("The 2d section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the United States says that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. We are of opinion that it is the undoubted right of every citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other State with his property of every description, including negro slaves, without being in any way subject to forfeit his property for having done so, provided he does not subject his property by a residence to the action of the laws of the State in which he may so reside.").
otherwise. 67 But outside the courts, the asserted right of slave transit seems to have generated little discussion before 1850. Not surprisingly, courts in states enforcing such laws uniformly rejected the claims of free blacks, principally on the grounds that such persons were not citizens under the Constitution. 76 But an alternative argument was frequently made: even if they were citizens, free blacks were entitled only to interstate equality and not interracial equality or any other rights; that is, visiting free blacks were entitled to no exemption from local racist laws, but only to be treated as well, or as badly, as native, local free blacks. 77 In dicta, however, at least two northeastern courts tacitly disputed this strict interstateequality reading. 78 Unlike slave transit, black citizenship was a matter of prominent political controversy well before the 1850s. The three principal occasions for substantial debate were (1) the 1820 debates over the admission of Missouri under a state constitution that excluded free blacks, (2) the efforts in the 1840s by Massachusetts citizens and legislators to challenge the laws of South Carolina and Louisiana that prohibited the entry of free black seamen, and (3) we are not at liberty to adjust the rights of citizenship among ourselves without being limited and restrained by the slaveholding legislatures of the south" who deny to local free blacks "the rights which citizenship confers").
debates in midwestern and western states of the 1840s and 1850s over proposals to restrict the immigration and commerce of free blacks. 79 For the most part, advocates of black citizenship asserted or assumed that such laws violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause on the grounds that free blacks, as bona fide citizens, were constitutionally entitled to the privilege of travel, residence, commerce, etc. 80 These advocates rejected or conspicuously ignored the strict interstate-equality reading, even though some of the challenged laws (such as laws discriminating against migrating free blacks only) could have been challenged on that basis alone. 81 Friends of black citizens' rights were apparently unwilling to rely on the generosity that a state might show its own resident free blacks. As early as the 1820 Missouri debates (as in subsequent court cases), southern authorities had expressly invoked the right to expel free blacks in defense of the right of exclusion. 82 Racist public opinion in western states would surely have withheld such generosity to locals if the price were more black immigration. 83 , then by the constitution of the U. States they are entitled to 'all the immunities and privileges of the citizens of Connecticut,' under like circumstances. I might say, perhaps, any citizens, but I have no occasion to ask for more than is in this state allowed to our colored population . . . ." (emphasis added)).
82 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 549 (1820) (statement of Rep. Barbour of Virginia) ("Has not Missouri a right to send off beyond her limits persons of color when free? Virginia has done it, and Missouri must have the same right as Virginia. And here Mr. B. repeated his question, had Missouri a power to get rid of all the free people of color now there, and yet not the power to prevent others from going there?"); see also supra note 50.
83 In the nineteenth century, slaveholding states became increasingly intolerant of the resident free-black population, and some western states gave serious consideration to proposals to expel the resident black population.
84 At times, some even argued that the Clause prohibited racial discrimination with respect to the suffrage, at least as applied to migrating black citizens. In contrast, southern politicians, like southern courts, frequently invoked the interstate-equality, or in pari conditione, reading. The most prominent instance of this argument occurred in the 1840s, during the heated dispute over the "negro seamen acts." By South Carolina's law, for instance, free blacks found on board were subject to detention in local jails until the ship's departure, and even to be sold as slaves if the shipowner failed to pay the expense of the detention. 85 Controversial among some abolitionists since the 1820s, these laws generated national debate in the 1840s when Massachusetts leaders sought federal relief. In 1841, 150 prominent "citizens of the United States" from Massachusetts (including future Justice Benjamin Curtis 86 ), petitioned Congress for action, and to "render effectual in their behalf the privileges of citizenship secured by the Constitution." 87 In response, a majority of a House committee declared "no hesitation in agreeing with the memorialists, that the acts of which they complain, are violations of the privileges of citizenship guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States," for "what may be the precise interpretation given to this clause of the Constitution" and "[h]owever extended or however limited may be the privileges and immunities which it secures, the citizens of each State are entitled to them equally, without discrimination of color or condition." 88 In other words, the Clause prohibited, at least to some extent, interracial discrimination and not merely interstate discrimination. Still, the Committee concluded that Congress had no authority to provide that effective relief that could be found only in the courts or in the southern state legislatures. 89 The minority report, however, authored by North Carolina's Kenneth Rayner, reflected the southern opinion that even if free blacks could be citizens, each state "is bound to extend to the citizens of each and every state [only] the same privileges and immunities she extends to her own 'under What the precise extent of those privileges are, it is unnecessary here to inquire, so long as it must be conceded that they cover immunity from gross wrongs. So long as South Carolina arrogates the right of seizing, imprisoning, whipping and selling as slaves for life, any member of the social system of Massachusetts, without cause assigned, hearing or trial, just so long is that immunity referred to in the Constitution wholly set at nought. 93 During the 1850 debates over the Fugitive Slave Act, the national argument over these acts resumed. Many northerners objected that southern violations of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause, by the negro seamen acts, had been more outrageous than any northern violation of Article IV's Fugitive Slave Clause. 94 In response, leading Southerners again insisted that free blacks were entitled to not more than the "privileges and immunities 90 what wrongs, for the sake of sustaining a bloody and barbarous system, you outrage humanity in the persons of colored men born and reared upon your own soil, I demand of you, by the sacred guaranty of your constitutional obligations, that the humblest of my citizens when a sojourner in your territory, shall be secure in all the great fundamental rights of human nature.").
94 Daniel Webster, The Constitution and the Union (Mar. 7, 1850), in THE GREAT SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 600, 620-21 (1886) (calling the imprisonment of free black seamen a "tangible and irritating cause of grievance at the North" as northerners deem "such imprisonments illegal and unconstitutional; and as the cases occur constantly and frequently, they regard it as a great grievance").
accorded to citizens in pari conditione of the States where these laws obtain and are enforced." 95 Ohio's Senator Salmon Chase responded by insisting that "the privileges of citizens in every other state" included "those rights and immunities, that security and that protection to which [all] citizens generally, male or female, minors or adults, are entitled." 96 But it was not merely the South where efforts were made to restrict the travel and economic rights of free blacks. In the Midwest and West, various proposals and laws generated extensive debate in the mid-nineteenth century. In Ohio, for instance, pro-racial-equality legislators successfully argued that the state's "black laws"-which restricted free blacks' right to travel, reside, work, and testify-violated Article IV, since the laws "require of the colored citizen coming from other States what is required of no other men, from any other section of our country" and thus "the colored citizens of other States, who come here to reside, are not by our laws entitled to the same 'privileges and immunities' as the citizens of this State." 97
Right of White Citizens to Travel (Even with Their Opinions)
Besides its efforts in Congress, Massachusetts attempted to launch a judicial challenge to these laws. The South's violent response occasioned a parallel claim-that free white citizens of one state had not only an absolute right to travel but also, perhaps, to speak freely in the other states. In 1844, the Massachusetts legislature sent attorneys Samuel Hoar and Henry Hubbard to South Carolina and Louisiana, respectively, to file a federal suit against the 95 negro seamen acts. 98 Both Hoar and Hubbard were effectively driven from the South under threat of mob violence, a threat sanctioned by state officials. 99 In response, many northerners complained that South Carolina and Louisiana had violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause not only by enforcing the negro seamen acts, but also by failing to protect Hoar and Hubbard's right to travel and file a lawsuit to challenge these acts. 100 As one contemporary recalled:
How such an event was related to the Constitution may be judged by reference to [the Privileges and Immunities Clause]. The anti-slavery men of the North bore this patiently, and only raised another degree their determination to achieve that sublime revenge which the poet [John Greenleaff] Whittier invoked on that occasion: "Have they chained our free-born men? Let us unchain theirs." 101 The treatment of Hoar and Hubbard was only the most prominent example of the intolerance faced by white antislavery citizens visiting the South. From the 1830s onward, it became increasingly unsafe to travel in the South if one simply held, let alone expressed, convictions friendly to the freedom and citizenship rights of blacks, due to both legal restriction and politically sanctioned violence. There were few reported cases of prosecutions, because tolerated mob violence proved so effective. 102 One (in)famous incident involved an Oberlin student, Amos Dresser, who having been "found in possession of an anti-slavery paper with one of the so-called incendiary pictures, . . . was severely whipped and expelled from the South." 103 In response to these outrages, some antislavery northerners understandably turned to the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a source of not only the right to travel, but also the freedoms of opinion, speech, and press. 104 With reference to the Dresser incident, Iowa's George Ellis declared that, by the Clause, a citizen of Iowa should enjoy in Louisiana "the right of free speech and free thought" as well as "the right of locomotion," for "he is just as completely guarded and protected [ Iowa." 105 These rights are to be enjoyed "wherever the flag of this Union may wave." 106 In a similar vein, Yale jurist Joseph Larned 107 applied Corfield, Blackstone, and other authorities to reject the in pari conditione reading, and to vindicate the "absolute and unqualified" protection for "civil immunities in their largest and most extensive sense," which rights included not only certain rights of person and property, but also the "rights of conscience." 108 The claim that the privileges of citizenship embraced the freedoms of communication seemed a plausible conclusion from Corfield. Justice Bushrod Washington had there defined "privileges and immunities of citizens" as those "which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union." 109 The freedoms of speech and press would seem to qualify. Washington's law teacher, James Wilson, had written, "The citizen under a free government has a right to think, to speak, to write, to print, and to publish freely, but with decency and truth, concerning publick men, publick bodies, and publick measures"; 110 so essential to that "control over their rulers, which resides in the free people of these United States" that it has "become a constitutional principle in this country, that 'every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments, on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and that no law can rightfully be passed to restrain or abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press.'" 112 Although analytically persuasive, this elaboration of Corfield remained outside the political mainstream for at least three reasons. First, citizens and officials in the South would simply not tolerate the open communication of anything resembling abolitionism. In denying Hoar the right to travel and challenge South Carolina's laws, the state's legislature heartily approved the coercion: Hoar came here "not as a citizen of the United States, but as the emissary of a Foreign Government, hostile to our domestic institutions, and with the sole purpose of subverting our internal peace." 113 Louisiana's legislature ratified Hubbard's violent expulsion in similar terms. 114 Second, northerners lacked the political will to even suggest the extensive federal coercive presence that was necessary to ensure this freedom. 115 Indeed, some antislavery jurists tended to insist on the right to travel with one's opinions, but not necessarily the right to communicate those opinions in other states. 116 Third, significant northern authority, especially James Kent, had supported the strict interstate-equality reading, 117 Although politically prominent, these debates proved only sporadic, and were effectively marginalized in the wake of the Compromise of 1850. In the 1852 election, the two major parties effectively declared all slavery-related issues "settled" and denounced as troublemakers those who would raise these question again. 119 Former northern grievances were therefore relegated to a third party, the Free Soil Party, which declared, the practice of imprisoning colored seamen of other states while the vessels to which they belong lie in port, and refusing the exercise of the right [by Hoar and Hubbard] to bring such cases before the Supreme Court of the United States, to test the legality of such proceedings, is a flagrant violation persons of the same description are entitled to in the state to which the removal is made, and to none other"). (resolving that an affirmation of states' rights embraces "the whole subject of slavery agitation in Congress" and that, in light of the Compromise of 1850, "the democratic party will resist all attempts at renewing, in congress or out of it, the agitation of the slavery question, under whatever shape or color the attempt may be made"); Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Whig Party Platform of 1852, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb .edu/ws/index.php?pid=25856 (last visited Feb. 30, 2015) (accepting the Compromise of 1850 and declaring that "we deprecate all further agitation of the question thus settled, as dangerous to our peace; and will discountenance all efforts to continue or renew such agitation whenever, wherever, or however the attempt may be made").
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 120 The election left this noisy little party with only four seats in the House of Representatives and 4.9% of the presidential vote. 121 Besides this political marginalization, the Privileges and Immunities Clause remained largely unexplored even by jurists. As Attorney General Caleb Cushing remarked in 1856, the provision remained "that unexplored clause of the constitution." 122 Indeed, before the late 1850s, the judiciary had not offered any clear, authoritative interpretation. As one jurist wrote at time, "[t]his clause has not yet received the attention which from its importance it would have been expected to command. It has been considered but in a few instances, and no general authoritative exposition of it has yet been declared." 123 This judicial reluctance was surely related to the deep political divides, whether over black citizenship or otherwise. When, in 1856, the Supreme Court finally decided a case arising under the Clause, Justice Curtis, speaking for a unanimous bench, carefully avoided any general interpretation, partly because the provision involved "matters of delicacy and great importance. . In a footnote, the author explained that "[t]he case known as the Dred Scott Case, recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, is understood to have incidentally discussed this subject; but we have as yet no authoritative report of the judgment of the court." Id. at 604, n. †; see also CHARLES B. GOODRICH, THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT 285, 288 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1853) (stating that the Clause's "import and effect has not been the subject of consideration or of adjudication in the courts of the United States" and the Clause has "been the subject of error and mistake in opinions which have been put forth"); The Case of Dred Scott, 20 MONTHLY L. REP. 61, 80 (1857) ("Precisely what rights are guarantied by this clause, or how it is to be enforced, has never been judicially determined, nor has its practical construction been uniform . . . ."). 124 Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1855) ("We do not deem it needful to attempt to define the meaning of the word privileges in this clause of the constitution. It is safer, and more in accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal, to leave its meaning to be determined, in each case, upon a view of the particular rights asserted and denied therein. And especially is this true, when we are dealing with so broad a provision, involving matters not only of great delicacy and importance, but which are of such a character, that any merely abstract definition could scarcely be correct; and a failure to make it so would certainly produce mischief."); see also Sears v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 36 Ind. 267, 276 (1871) (making this same claim in precisely these words); Ward v. State, 31 Md. 279, 290 (1869) (stating, with reference to Conner, that "[t]he Supreme Court [has] declined to give a general construction to this clause"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2760, 2765 (remarks of Sen. Howard) (noting that the Supreme Court, in Conner, had refrained from describing either the "nature" or the "extent" of the rights guaranteed by the Clause). Justice Curtis, the author of the Conner opinion, was well aware of one of these delicate matters, for fifteen years earlier, he had signed the controversial petition challenging
III. THE MEANINGS OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE: 1857-1861
In the four years before the Civil War, however, the Privileges and Immunities Clause suddenly became a prominent subject of sustained national debate, whether in courts, legislative halls, or among the people at large. The aggravated fracturing of the American polity occasioned at least three distinct and conflicting interpretations of the Clause: (1) a pro-slavery, absolute-rights reading; (2) an anti-slavery, absolute-rights reading adopted by Republicans, which sometimes incorporated claims of black citizenship; and (3) the strictly interstate-equality reading still held by many northern and border-state Democrats, especially on the bench.
A. The Pro-Slavery Absolute-Rights Reading
In the 1850s, in courts, legislatures, and the press, southern Democrats and even some of their northern allies began to insist that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed a right of slave transit as part of the national privileges of citizenship secured by Article IV. As indicated above, the argument had first appeared in a handful of obscure cases. But in the 1850s, this litigation achieved national prominence. In California, a citizen from Mississippi, in a suit to recover custody of an alleged slave, argued before the state's supreme court that by force of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, he was exempt from local antislavery law while temporarily in California. 125 On the other coast, and more famously, this same argument was made in New York by Charles O'Conor, who had been hired by the State of Virginia 126 to defend the slaveholding rights of one of Virginia's citizens: Juliet Lemmon, whose alleged property (eight slaves) had been emancipated by New York authorities while she was sojourning in the state. 127 O'Conor argued that the Clause secured the privileges of U.S. citizenship:
The Constitution recognizes the legal character "citizen of the United States" as well as citizen of a particular State. The latter term refers only to domicil; for every citizen of a particular State is a citizen of the United States. And the object of this section is to secure to the citizen, when within a State in which he is not domiciled, the general privileges and immunities which, in the very nature of citizenship, as recognized and established by the Federal Constitution, belonged to that status; so that by no partial and adverse legislation of a State into which he may go as a stranger or a sojourner can he be deprived of them. Under the Clause, every citizen sojourning in another state enjoys not "the privileges of citizens of the particular State in which they are wayfarers, or of the State in which they are domiciled, but the general privileges of a citizen of the United States;" he is entitled to the rites of hospitality, to the ordinary enjoyment of society during his temporary sojourn with us, the undisturbed possession of his property, and the undisturbed enjoyment of his domestic relations, and of every accessary and incident of a purely personal or domestic character which he may be permitted to enjoy, provided he does not invade "the peace and happiness of our people." 129 In opposition, William Evarts endorsed the simple interstate-equality reading: the Clause merely secures "to the citizens of every State, within every other, the privileges and immunities (whatever they may be) accorded in each to its own citizens." 130 The highest courts in both California and New York gave serious consideration to this claim. In California, the court agreed. After citing with approval both the Dred Scott case and the pro-slave-transit interpretations offered by the Missouri and Illinois courts, 131 the judges declared "that the right of transit through each State, with every species of property known to the Constitution of the United States, and recognized by that paramount law, is secured by that instrument to each citizen, and does not depend upon the uncertain and changeable ground of mere comity." 132 This conclusion was endorsed by both the participating judges. 133 A third member of the court, Stephen Field-the future author of the Court's seminal opinion in Paul v. Virginia 134 -was conspicuously absent 135 and remained deafeningly silent about this controversial decision throughout his entire life. 136 In New York, however, a five-justice majority rejected the claim and adopted the interstate-equality reading. Writing for the court, Judge Denio held that the Clause meant simply "that in a given State, every citizen of every other State shall have the same privileges and immunities-that is, the same rights-which the citizens of that State possess." 137 Still, three of the eight justices rejected this interpretation, sided with Virginia, and endorsed the right of slave transit, whether on constitutional or other grounds. 138 The pro-slavery argument appeared prominently outside the courts as well. In 1858, former Attorney General Cushing seemingly complained that northern states had engaged in "abandonment or perversion of the Constitution" by assuming "to confiscate the property and other domestic rights of citizens of the South, sojourning or in transit at the North." 139 Some proslavery jurists made similar claims. 140 Prominent Democratic periodicals and jurists made the same argument, including the Washington Union, an organ of the Buchanan administration, 141 and the Jacksonian Democratic Review. 142 In the Review, Horace Dresser, like O'Conor, insisted that the Clause secured to sojourners certain absolute rights throughout the Union: the privileges of a "federal, national, or American citizenship," 143 defined as the "immunities and privileges of citizenship" that subjects in British North America had enjoyed before independence "in their colonial capacity"; found in "the great catalogue of English usages and customs," including, ultimately, the right to become "a landholder, a householder, a slaveholder," etc. 144 Unlike Justice Washington, then, Dresser found the standard not in the rights enjoyed by citizens of all free governments, including the several states since independence, but in the rights enjoyed just before independence and only in the North American colonies, where slavery was legal. 145 Conversely, Dresser repudiated Kent's interstate-equality reading-and attributed Kent's "loose and careless" interpretation to a failure to acknowledge "a fixed, permanent, federal citizenship, contradistinguished from State citizenship." 146 During the winter of secession, Confederate leaders endorsed this interpretation. In December 1860, Senator Jefferson Davis charted that some northern states had violated the citizens' constitutional right to "free transit over all the other states" by seizing "property recognized by the Constitution of the United States, but prohibited by the laws of that State," 147 and South Carolina's secession convention similarly alleged that in New York, "even the [constitutional] right of transit for a slave has been denied by her tribunals." 148 Finally, to avoid any such misconstruction, in their new and improved constitution, Confederate leaders attached a clarificatory provision to the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired. 149 This pro-slavery interpretation must be considered novel, if not radical, in at least two respects. First, the evidence from the framing of the Constitution indicates that it was wholly opposed to the original understanding of Article IV. 150 (July 10, 1861) , http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038518/1861-07-10/ed-1/seq-2/ (stating that this provision does "no more than place upon the old Constitution the meaning which its framers intended it to have" and "the true reading of the old Constitution, as expounded by the highest judicial tribunal"). Corfield. The right to hold slaves was not enjoyed by the citizens of all free governments, 151 nor had it been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states since independence. 152 Second, this new position marked a stark reversal from the position taken by southerners, and especially South Carolina, just a few decades earlier. This new position, affirming a constitutional right to exemption from local laws, could seemingly support the claims made on behalf of traveling black citizens. When faced with this implication in the Lemmon case, O'Conor provided this "very short answer. It is this: these free negroes are not and never can be made citizens of the United States." 153 In a similar vein, in 1859, Mississippi's High Court of Errors and Appeals frankly acknowledged that its treatment of free blacks from other states was flatly inconsistent with blacks' enjoyment of the rights of citizenship. 154 No longer did proslavery Americans use the interstate-equality reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to reject blacks' Article IV claims. Rather, pro-slavery jurists relied exclusively on the non-citizenship of free blacks to affirm the constitutionality of local racist policies.
Ironically, this new absolute-rights interpretation of the Clause gave southerners a (virtually) new argument 155 against black citizenship: free blacks could not be citizens precisely because they would thus be entitled, while sojourning in the slaveholding states, to the absolute rights of travel, property acquisition, speech, assembly, arms, etc., racist state laws to the contrary notwithstanding-and this result was unthinkable. This parade of hor-ribles was famously set forth by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott 156 and echoed by pro-slavery jurists. 157 The largely new, pro-slavery absolute-rights reading involved another possible northern objection: Should not sojourning abolitionists enjoy as much an exemption from local anti-abolitionist laws as sojourning slaveholders were claiming against local anti-slavery law? But Charles O'Conor and Justice Taney, at least, seemed to have anticipated this counter-claim. In his closing argument, O'Conor carefully qualified the absolute rights of sojourning citizens with this phrase: "without invading the peace and happiness of our people." 158 He elaborated, "Over this right of free intercourse between the citizens of different States, the States have reserved no power except the police power. That natural and inalienable right of self-defence is indeed reserved to the States." 159 Room was thus left for the southern states to insist that they could, in the interest of protecting the peace of the local white community, use the police power to suppress any speech they deemed incendiary.
Taney anticipated the objection by providing a more targeted and explicit-and thus ham-handed-qualification: the sojourning citizen would enjoy "the full liberty of speech in public and in private" but only "upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak." 160 Taney conspicuously did not make this qualification with respect to the right to travel, hold meetings, and bear arms. 161 This awkward, incongruous qualification served the apparent 156 If free blacks could be citizens, the Constitution would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went. purpose of ensuring that the precedent would support the sojourning citizens' constitutional right to hold slaves, but not his right to speak out against slavery.
Despite some favorable implications of the new southern position for anti-slavery constitutionalism, 162 for the most part, the new pro-slavery interpretation sparked outrage. Republicans saw the harbingers of the "next Dred Scott" decision that would declare slavery a constitutional right not only in the territories, but even in the free states-at least for sojourners. Indeed, not only had Chief Justice Taney established the groundwork for such a development, but Justice Nelson had expressly declared open the question of whether the constitutional "rights and privileges" of a "citizen of the . . . United States" included "the right of the master with his slave of transit into or through a free State." 163 In apparent response to the question, Justice McLean, in dissent, obtrusively asserted that the right of slave transit "is a matter which, as I suppose, belongs exclusively to the State." 164 As Lincoln noted, Nelson's opinion had essentially declared the state's authority over slavery to be an "open question." 165 New York's legislature feared the Court's answer to this question. In response to Dred Scott, the legislature quoted with outrage the dreams of "the devotees of slavery" that the "slave driver" will one day "call the roll of his manacled gang at the foot of the momument [sic] on Bunker Hill, reared and consecrated to freedom." 166 The reference was to a comment, attributed to Senator Robert Tombs of Georgia, that he would soon call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill. 167 Likewise, the California court's pro-slavery decision was roundly denounced in local newspapers. 168 The arguments made by the Washington Union and the state of Virginia (through O'Conor) only confirmed these fears. 169 Indeed, the fears seemed reasonable-as both the New York Tribune feared, and the New York Herald happily expected, that the Supreme Court would reverse the Lemmon decision. 170 
B. The Antislavery, Absolute-Rights Reading
While pro-slavery Americans were advancing one absolute-rights reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Republicans were promoting their own. The rise of the party had two prominent effects on the ways in which anti-slavery northerners used the Clause. First, perhaps ironically, the electoral success of the party induced anti-slavery northerners to set aside the once prominent issue of black citizenship. The new party had rescued free soilers and other anti-slavery citizens from marginalization and incorporated them into a national anti-slavery party with hopes of national success; but this success required the support of citizens, especially in the Midwest, who were at once both anti-slavery and racist. Indeed, the constitutions of several antislavery states specifically prohibited the immigration of free blacks. A winning Republican coalition required the alliance of pro-black-citizenship New Englanders with avowedly racist, but anti-slavery Midwesterners. 168 Franklin, supra note 136, at 151-53 (stating that the "opinion shocked and angered many Californians" and chronicling the hostile reaction in the California press). It should be noted that the outrage was directed at two features of this anti-slavery opinion: (1) the interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and (2) most outrageously, the conclusion that although his purported master had become a resident of California and was thus constitutionally subject to local anti-slavery law, he was entitled, as a matter of equity, to an equitable exemption, which meant that Archy would still be forcibly returned to slavery. Id. Eventually, Archy was freed by a federal court in a different habeas proceeding. Id. at 153. 169 APPENDIX TO THE CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., 329 (1858) ("[W]hen the Lemmon case, now before the courts in New York, shall find its way to the same tribunal which decided Dred Scott, slavery . . . will be planted in every free State of the Union.") (remarks of Rep. Mason Tappan from New Hampshire); E.P. Barrows, The State and Slavery, 73 BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 749, 796 n.1 (1862) (recounting the fears of Bostonian Joel Parker that the Supreme Court was already writing the pro-slavery opinion for the Lemmon appeal). 170 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 265 (1861) (citing the New York Tribune's opinion that O'Conor's argument "shadows forth the ground which that Court intends to occupy as the next step in advance," and therefore "that there can be no law of any one of the Free States competent to its abolition within the limits of such State, while a single Slave State remains in the Union"); Editorial, The Great Question of the Day-Is Secession Revolution or Not?, N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 27, 1860, at 4 (allaying secessionists' fears as to slave-transit right under Article IV, because "[f]rom some of the grounds on which the decision in the Dred Scott case was based, there can be little doubt that the decision of the New York courts will be reversed, and the rights of the slaveholder maintained").
The reaction to the Dred Scott decision manifested how the issue strained the Republican coalition. Republicans were united in rejecting Taney's claim that the Constitution mandated slavery in the territories, but divided as to the Court's principal holding-that free blacks were not citizens under the Constitution. The legislatures of Maine and New Hampshire, for instance, denounced the decision, and specifically insisted that free blacks born in those states were citizens and thus fully entitled to the privileges of citizenship in the other states under Article IV. 171 But west of the Appalachians, Republican leaders were divided. Consider, for instance, the 1858 debates over Oregon's proposed constitution, where the Bill of Rights protected Oregonians in such rights as the freedom of speech and press, as well as the freedom from the presence of free blacks: "No free negro or mulatto, not residing in this State at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall come, reside or be within this State, or hold any real estate, or make any contracts, or maintain any suit therein . . . ." 172 At the Oregon constitutional convention, seemingly no one in opposition invoked the privileges of citizenship under Article IV, as the sole recorded objection was to prohibit blacks from filing suit was to deny them the universal human right of protection of the laws. 173 In Congress, however, Ohio's Congressman Bingham objected to the entire provision, and invoked not only human rights, but also the constitutional privileges of citizenship. 174 At the same time, however, his fellow Republican from Illinois, Senator Lyman Trumbull, tersely stated that he was "not prepared" to say that a state could not exclude free blacks from other states. 175 Trumbull was wise to avoid the issue. During the Illinois Senate campaign of the previous year, Abraham Lincoln had badly stumbled over the question of free-black citizenship. In his initial response to the decision, Lin- coln indicated his opposition to the Court's holding that free blacks were not constitutional citizens. 176 A year later, Lincoln suggested that he favored free blacks' enjoyment of citizenship under Article IV as well as Article III, for he noted, with apparent disapproval, the Court's decision "to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause]." 177 During the fall debates with Lincoln, Douglas seized on this latter remark, and accused Lincoln of supporting black citizenship under the Clause. According to Douglas, such constitutional citizenship would invalidate Illinois laws that prohibited blacks' (1) immigration into the state, (2) participation in the suffrage, 178 and (3) intermarriage with whites. 179 Lincoln's response was less than straightforward. Under pressure from Douglas, he eventually responded at the close of the fourth debate by saying that his objection was only that other states should be able to grant citizenship to free blacks, but that he would oppose any such action by Illinois. 180 But in the last debate at Alton, Lincoln performed a complete flip-flop, declaring that he never had any objection whatsoever to the Court's decision on black citizenship. 181 Second, at the same time, however, the Republican Party's success brought to the center of American political debate the previously marginal 176 See 2 LINCOLN, supra note 165, at 398, 408 (arguing for Scott's citizenship "at least" under Article III). 177 Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 178 See 3 LINCOLN, supra note 25, at 9. Lincoln said:
If you desire negro citizenship, if you desire to allow them to come into the State and settle with the white man, if you desire them to vote on an equality with yourselves, and to make them eligible to office, to serve on juries, and to adjudge your rights, then support Mr. Lincoln and the Black Republican party, who are in favor of the citizenship of the negro. 181 Lincoln, supra note 25, at 283, 298-99 ("I never have complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it held that a negro could not be a citizen . . . . I mentioned as a fact that they had decided that a negro could not be a citizen . . . . I stated that, without making any complaint of it at all." (emphasis added)).
claim that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed citizens an absolute freedom of opinion-and even freedom of speech-state anti-antislavery laws and practices to the contrary notwithstanding. Southern intolerance of anti-slavery speech seemed absurd insofar as it effectively prevented members of the second largest party from traveling in the South, let alone speaking there. Lincoln (in)famously could not safely campaign in the South.
During the 1860 campaign, Republicans increasingly complained that the slaveholding states had violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause by failing to secure the freedom of opinion to anti-slavery citizens. Sometimes the complaints extended not only to interstate intolerance, but also intrastate intolerance-that is, toward native-born citizens of those states. In Congress, Maine's John Perry complained that citizens of both free and slave states had been "driven out . . . not for anything they have done; but merely for entertaining opinions held by Washington, Jefferson, and Madison." 182 Others made nearly identical arguments, sometimes invoking the ambiguous right to "entertain" opinions 183 -which rendered ambiguous whether it encompassed not only the right to hold opinions, but also the right to express them. The slave states violated the Clause, it was said, because citizens "for no other offence than that of being known to entertain sentiments unfavourable to slavery, have been banished from the state where they resided." 184 To cite one example of this violence, during the 1860 campaign, William Wood, a recent Harvard graduate, was forcibly shipped out of Charleston "for expressing, under compulsion, his Republican predilections," 185 thus demonstrating to Republicans that the Clause "has had no vitality" in the South. 186 To more radical, anti-Constitution abolitionists, such violence proved that the Privileges and Immunities Clause "was worth less than the spoiled parchment it was written on." 187 Pursuant to these widespread grievances, Republicans formally asserted their rights to freedom of thought under the Clause. 189 At the National Convention in May 1860, Ohio's Joshua Giddings (a friend and mentor to John Bingham) 190 introduced the following resolution:
That we deeply sympathize with those men who have been driven, some from their native states and others from the states of their adoption, and are now exiled from their homes on account of their opinions; and we hold the Democratic party responsible for this gross violation of that clause of the Constitution which declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. 191 The resolution was adopted unanimously. 192 This plank is remarkable in several respects. First, although the resolution has manifest relevance to the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, 193 . This comment appears to be a paraphrase of the 1860 platform; Delano, it turns out, was, with Giddings, a member of Ohio's delegation at the Convention, and had seconded Lincoln's initial nomination. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CON-For example, this resolution, coupled with Giddings's successful motion in 1856 to incorporate a "due process" plank in the 1856 Republican platform, laid the groundwork for Section 1: just as the party had in 1856 declared that the Due Process Clause prevented any federal action to foster slavery in the territories, 195 the party in 1860 added that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prevented the states from interfering with antislavery citizens' freedom of travel and opinion. These two clauses together formed what Bingham would later call that "immortal bill of rights." 196 Moreover, this resolution indicates that by 1860, the Republican Party formally endorsed an absolute-rights reading of the Clause, and one that would protect citizens even in their own state. The resolve highlights the dramatic shift in popular constitutional interpretation; by 1860, the winning national party thus embraced a freedom-of-opinion interpretation that, however consistent with Corfield, had once been endorsed only by some marginal abolitionists. As a Giddings biographer noted, "[t]his was a strong utterance to go before the country with, and was opposed by many, but there was a general feeling that the veteran's vision was clear and that the country would ratify his judgment; and it did." 197 At the same time, however, the party's endorsement of a national freedom of "opinion" avoided an emphatic stand on the question of whether the Clause entitled citizens to not only privately hold their opinions, but also the freedom to communicate those opinions. But during 1860 and 1861, several prominent Republicans expressly avowed that the Clause protected not only the Corfieldian right to travel, but also the privilege of open discussion. 198 Maine Congressmen Daniel Somes quoted the Clause to support his claim that northern citizens have a right to publish and speak abolitionist opinions in the South. 199 In an impassioned speech in Congress, Owen Lovejoy, with apparent reference to the Clause, invoked "the aid of the General Government to protect me, as an American citizen, in my rights as an American citizen" including "the right of discussing this question of slavery anywhere, on any square foot of American soil over which the stars and stripes float, and to which the privileges and immunities of the Constitution extend." 200 In a similar vein, Republican jurist Daniel Gardner, in his 1860 treatise on international law, affirmed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause secured certain "right[s] of American citizenship" and identified, among these "universal American rights," not only the travel and economic privileges enumerated in Corfield, but also the "[f]reedom of speech and of the press, and security of life, liberty, and property." 201 Just a year earlier, Bingham, for his part, had declared these "privileges and immunities of citizens" to include not only the Corfieldian economic liberties "to work and enjoy the product of their toil," but also the freedom "to argue and to utter, according to conscience. 
C. The Privileges and Immunities Clause as Proposed by the Washington Peace Conference
After the election, during the Winter of Secession, Republicans did not forget their platform. In the debates over compromise measures, mostly designed to mollify secessionists, Republicans still insisted that something be offered to the North; a common proposal was a statute or constitutional amendment securing congressional enforcement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Some of these measures aimed merely at that equal protection necessary to permit safe travel and residence. The House Committee of Thirty-Three, for instance, called for enforcement of the Clause, and petitioned state legislatures to take the initiative, and thus obviate the need for federal action, to ensure that traveling citizens enjoy (1) "the same protection as citizens of such State enjoy" and (2) protection "against popular violence or illegal summary punishment, without trial in due form of law, for imputed crimes." 203 At the Washington Peace Conference, a quasi-constitutional convention held in February, an even broader constitutional amendment was debated and approved. The delegates included four of the fifteen future members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction-Maine's William Fessenden (the Committee's chair), Iowa's James Grimes, Massachusetts's George Boutwell, and Maryland's Reverdy Johnson-as well as other future members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, such as New Jersey's Frederick Frelinghuysen and Maine's Lot Morrill. 204 The delegates also included Pennsylvania's David Wilmot (of "Wilmot Proviso" fame), future Chief Justice Salmon Chase, and David Dudley Field, brother to future Justice Stephen Field. 205 It was David Field who first introduced a proposal to incorporate into the proposed Thirteenth Amendment the requirement that Congress enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause: "Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." 206 Field said that this addition would make a compromise amendment "much more acceptable to the northern people," 207 by "secur[ing] protection in the South to the citizens of the free States." 208 For a similar purpose, Wilmot proposed a measure that would require Congress to provide monetary compensation to victims of mob violence. 209 Wilmot's proposal had the distinct advantage of easy enforcement, as mere monetary compensation would not require an extensive coercive presence to protect antislavery travelers and speakers.
Eventually, after some debate, the Convention adopted a proposal introduced by Frelinghuysen in this way:
The people of the free States have complained, and not without good reason, that one clause in the Constitution is not carried into effect in some of the slaveholding States. Their complaints are similar to those made on the part of the South, which it is the purpose of the seventh section to remove. If there have been instances at the North where mobs and riotous assemblies have obstructed the administration of justice in the case of fugitive slaves, so there have been instances at the South where mobs and riots have disregarded the rights of citizens of Northern States. I propose to deal fairly by all sections. Let us remove both causes of complaint. I move to amend the seventh section by adding thereto the following words: "Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." 210 This section was approved on a strictly sectional vote: all of the free states, and two of the border slaveholdings states (Delaware and Maryland) approved, while Kentucky and Missouri joined Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee in dissent. 211 The provision formed the last clause of the Convention's proposed Thirteenth Amendment. 212 The debates over this proposed Privileges and Immunities Clause highlight three key features of Republican approaches to the original Privileges and Immunities Clause on the eve of the Civil War. First, the debates demonstrate the degree to which black citizenship divided northern opinion. When Illinois delegate Thomas Turner reiterated Field's initial proposal, 213 the measure was temporarily defeated by a poison pill introduced by Illinois's Stephen Logan, who moved to add the qualifier "'free white' before the word 'citizens.'" 214 Logan's racial amendment was approved by virtually all of the states outside the northeast, with only the New England states, New York, and Iowa dissenting. 215 Thus amended, however, the measure pleased no one and was unanimously rejected by all the state delegations. 216 Eventually northerners were able to coordinate and approve the "clean" version, as reproposed by Frelinghuysen. A few southern delegates, after the Conference, attributed the failure to incorporate the racial restriction to northerners' thinly veiled effort to give free blacks Article IV rights. 217 21 , 1st Sess., App. at 574 (1861) (explaining that "after a failure, on our part, to make it apply only to 'free white' citizens, it was adopted by the vote of all the non-slaveholding States" and asserting that "the last clause makes it imperative on Congress to pro-records indicate that northern delegates were concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with the rights of white citizens. 218 Second, these debates also revealed the degree to which southern leaders feared, and at least some northerners hoped, that congressional enforcement of the Clause would secure not only the right to travel, but also the freedom of antislavery speech. Kentucky's James Guthrie objected that Wilmot's proposal would "encourage[ ] seditious speeches at the South," 219 and Tennessee's William Stephens complained the resulting "seditious speeches and purposes" would "excite discontent among our slaves." 220 In the subsequent debates in the Senate, southern opponents likewise objected that this proposal would give "[a]bolition leaders the right to promulgate their doctrines in the slave States." 221 His Virginian colleague, Robert Hunter, was equally indignant:
Congress shall have power to pass laws to force the States to receive those persons whom they have excluded from police considerations-considerations of domestic safety. Yes, sir, to force the States to receive persons who would be dangerous to their peace; to force upon them, if you will, abolition lecturers; to force upon them persons whom they regard as the most dangerous emissaries that could be sent among them; to enable Congress to obtrude, in fact, into all the business of the States. 222 In response, Northerners provided no reassurances. In the Convention, Wilmot tersely replied that Congress would not "protect a man in making seditious speeches in the slave States." 223 But he neither defined the word "seditious" nor said anything about non-seditious speech. 224 Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, Connecticut's Alfred Burham was openly demanding protection for free speech in the South. In his view, a properly enforced Article IV would protect not only the property rights of the slaveholder (under the Fugitive Slave Clause), but the personal rights of freemen under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, including the freedom of speech and press: freedom of speech, and the freedom of conscience are all stricken down? [A]nd when our own unoffending citizens of both sexes, and of all ages, are insulted, tarred and feathered, imprisoned, robbed, scourged, and in many instances murdered, by lawless and irresponsible mobs? But, sir, I will not pursue this further. I say, sir, with the committee, let there be a faithful observance on the part of all the States, and of all the citizens thereof, of all their constitutional obligations to each other and to the Federal Government; and let such necessary laws be enacted as will carry out that provision of the Constitution which declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and much will have been done towards restoring peace and harmony towards our distracted country. 225 In particular, Burnham said, southerners had violated the Clause, for:
[T]o us there is no freedom of speech among them, and that we would be mobbed for speaking the sentiment of Washington and Jefferson. And, sir, it is even said tauntingly of our President elect, that he dare not go and advocate his principles in the State [Kentucky] where rest the bones of his kindred. 226 Third, the measure, as proposed, avoided the complicated question whether Congress already had the power to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Supreme Court, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, had endorsed congressional power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause. 227 Many future Republicans, like Giddings and Chase, had denounced the decision. 228 Many, however, like Lincoln, that Kentucky native, fully endorsed Prigg and concluded that the Constitution not only empowered, but required Congress to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause. 229 The authors of the proposed Thirteenth Amendment, however, avoided the question: the Clause stipulated that "Congress shall provide by law for securing . . ."; 230 in this way, the existence of this congressional power was either assumed or granted by imposing the duty to exercise it.
On March 2, 1861, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected the Peace Conference's proposed amendment. 231 Two days later, upon his inauguration, Lincoln not only promised to enforce faithfully the Fugitive Slave Law but also advocated the adoption of a Privileges and Immunities Law: "And might it not be well, at the same time, to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarranties that 'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all previleges [sic] and immunities of citizens in the several States?" 232 Lincoln did not elsewhere explain this proposal. 233 Still, the context, including his enthusiastic support for the whole Republican platform, 234 indicates that his goal was primarily, if not exclusively, to protect the travel and opinion (or even speech) rights of white northerners, and not (yet) to secure the citizenship of free blacks. 235 Neither he nor his fellow Republicans were hoping to enjoy merely an exemption from interstate discrimination.
D. The Political Marginalization of the Interstate-Equality Reading
On the eve of the Civil War, then, the dominant political parties in the North and South ignored or rejected the strict in parti conditione reading. Instead, Republicans feared, and southern Democrats hoped, that the Supreme Court would enforce the Clause so as to require the free states to tolerate slavery. Meanwhile, southern Democrats feared, and Republicans hoped, that the Congress would enforce the Clause so as to require the slave states to tolerate the presence and even speech of antislavery citizens-perhaps regardless of race.
Despite this apparent opposition, there was substantial overlap between these two positions-an overlap that could be called a political consensus in 1860: that a national standard determined the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed in the other states, local laws to the contrary notwithstanding. Some Republicans were attentive to this convergence and invoked the proslavery reading of the Clause to support their anti-slavery, pro-black-citizenship reading.
Yale's William Larned, for instance, expressly embraced Taney's argument-viz., that if free blacks were citizens, they would enjoy an absolute right travel, hold meetings, bear arms, etc.; Larned called this passage "the strongest portion of Judge Taney's argument." 236 Taney's parade of horribles was no doubt Larned's fond hope. In response to Taney's fear that black citizenship would jeopardize the peace and safety of the slaveholding states, Larned replied that both "[t]he inconveniences resulting to the Southern states from the operation of this clause are greatly magnified." 237 Moreover, such a concern could not justify the Court's nullification of the plain text of Article IV:
It is not the province of the Court to legislate, but to interpret. These topics of inconvenience, therefore, cannot be intended as arguments against the policy of the clause, but as indications of the meaning of the clause in the minds of those who made it. [ This clause gives to abolitionists the right to enter any state whenever they please, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they please; to hold public meetings upon public affairs, and to enjoy full liberty of speech, in public and private, upon any subject whatever. 239 For Larned, therefore, Taney's interpretation was entirely accurate but with two major exceptions: (1) free blacks were, in fact, citizens of the United States, and (2) the privileges of national citizenship included the full freedom of speech, including abolitionist speech, state laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
In his treatise on slavery, John Codman Hurd likewise employed Taney's dicta to support his claim that the Clause secured national privileges to sojourning citizens. 240 Unlike Larned, however, Hurd was more subtle. [T]he effect of this clause is to continue the pre-existing common law of the colonies so far as it contained a standard of the rights of citizens of one locality appearing as domestic aliens within another jurisdiction; although, by the revolu-Although conceding the antebellum prevalence of the strictly interstateequality reading, 241 Hurd cited Corfield as contrary, more favorable authority, 242 and also quoted at length, with virtually no commentary, the two dicta from Taney's decision that strongly indicated a national standard. 243 Hurd thus left it to his readers to draw the connection: that Chief Justice Taney and Justice Bushrod Washington had properly identified a national standard of privileges. In the 1859 debates over Oregon's admission, two House Republicans likewise cited Taney in support of the Republican reading of the Clause. Henry Dawes, of Massachusetts, argued that if free blacks were citizens, then according to the Constitution, as expounded in the Dred Scott decision itself, this provision [of the proposed Oregon constitution] which attempts, not only to drive them from its border, but to prevent their holding property, making contracts, suing in the courts, or even eating the bread of life within her borders, does violate [the Privileges and Immunities Clause]. 244 tected by the Amendment. 247 And in the courts, Republican judges in Indiana and Alabama cited Taney's opinion to invalidate, state laws that prohibited African Americans, respectively, from making enforceable contracts, 248 and from intermarrying with whites. 249 In sum, as David Bogen has affirmed, "[i]n a general sense, the framers of the Civil War Amendments shared Taney's view and thus sought to effectuate a broad spectrum of rights when they guaranteed the privileges and immunities of citizenship to blacks." 250 In this political atmosphere, where the extremes met, the seemingly moderate, centrist interstate-equality reading became effectively marginalized. For the most part, in the political debates, few still vindicated this seemingly moderate, even judicious position. One notable exception came, not surprisingly, from a border state's delegation to the Peace Conference. In their subsequent report to the Kentucky legislature, they explained that congressional enforcement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause would be anodyne. The original Clause, they wrote, only "operates as a prohibition to each State from discriminating against the citizens of other States, and would make void all such legislation. The clause [proposed by the Conference] cannot do more than to make such discriminating laws void, and is therefore harmless." 251 In other words, this provision of the proposed Thirteenth Amendment would be largely a vain and idle enactment.
In the courts, however, the interstate-equality reading still predominated-even in the northern states. Northern Democrats like Benjamin Curtis in Dred Scott, and Hiram Denio in the Lemmon case had seemingly endorsed the position. 252 This reading, moreover, was vindicated in several cases-even in the "reddest" of Republican states like Connecticut. 253 In Minnesota, the State Supreme Court proposed this apparently straightforward reading, as a way of resolving many disputes: "Such an interpretation would, it is confidently believed, furnish an easy and satisfactory solution of many troublesome questions." 254 Still, this holding, expressed as a proposal, indicates that many Americans did not share the court's understanding.
One may well speculate as to why judges, even in northern states, were so reluctant to adopt the Republican understanding of the Clause. At least two factors were probably important. First, given the long political dominance of Jacksonian Democrats, Republicans were underrepresented in the federal judiciary and, to a lesser extent, even the state courts. Second, the judicial temperament was likely to prefer the interstate-equality reading to the absolute-rights reading of the Clause, given that the latter was (seemingly) novel and partisan, and might require far more judicial oversight of the political branches-and force them to declare that they and their fellow state citizens were entitled to fewer rights than visitors.
CONCLUSION
At the close of the Civil War, Republicans did not forget their antebellum project to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause. For many, complete victory required not only the defeat of secession and the abolition of slavery, but also, among other measures, the federal enforcement of the Clause. These efforts were manifest in treatises, 255 at least one state party platform, 256 a judicial opinion, 257 editorials, 258 congressional speeches 259 a Senate resolution, 260 and ultimately the Joint Committee on Reconstruction's first draft. 261 As indicated in the Introduction, the ambition of this Article is not to provide a comprehensive account of the original understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Still less does this Article hope to fully explain why this understanding was eviscerated by the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the historical evidence presented here suggests the following hypotheses that are worth further investigation.
First, Justice Miller, in the Slaughter-House Cases, was almost certainly mistaken in asserting that apart from the purpose to secure the freedom and citizenship of African-Americans, "none of [the Reconstruction Amendments] would have been even suggested." 262 To the contrary, even when Republicans proposed merely a containment policy on slavery, and were divided as to black citizenship, Republicans formally proposed statutes and constitutional amendments to better secure the white citizen's constitutional "privileges and immunities." And in 1860, the main issue of concern was the white antislavery citizen's right to travel and reside throughout the Union, with full freedom to entertain, and perhaps communicate, his opinions.
Second, Justice Miller was very probably mistaken in asserting that the "privileges and immunities" to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were sharply distinct from the privileges secured by Article IV. The Amendment was preceded by a decades-old struggle, intensified on the eve of the Civil War, concerning the Privileges and Immunities Clause. This dispute concerned the persons protected, the privileges guaranteed, and the propriety of congressional enforcement. In contrast, there is no record of any antebellum struggle to protect some set of "privileges and immunities" distinct from those of Article IV.
Third, the evidence indicates why the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment elected to use the term "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." As indicated above, the term had been used as a gloss on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, to clarify that the privileges to be accorded citizens from other states did not include the privileges, such as political rights, that each state might properly reserve to its own citizens. By using this clarifying term, the Joint Committee sought to address one of the chief objections to the Amendment's first draft: that arguably Article IV privileges included political rights. 263 Fourth, the evidence helps explain Bingham's enthusiasm for the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities Clause, and his reason for calling those two provisions the "immortal bill of rights." These two clauses had been quoted in the Republican Platform of 1860. And it was his mentor, Joshua Giddings, who had moved for the platform to include these provisions.
Fifth, the evidence provides support for what may be called partial incorporation-of freedom of speech and of the press, in particular. Still, this author has seen no evidence supporting the claim that anyone before the Civil War believed that the "privileges and immunities of citizens" encompassed all the rights secured against federal violation by the first eight amendments. Further, the evidence strongly undermines any claim that Americans believed that the federal Constitution's specific provisions exhausted the scope of these privileges. The right to travel and acquire real estate, for instance, figured prominently in nearly all the partial catalogues of citizenship's privileges.
Finally, the evidence gives some suggestion as to why the eventual Privileges or Immunities Clause was vulnerable to judicial misconstruction, whether deliberate or accidental.
The Clause by its strict terms did not settle, but raised a question. Other Reconstruction amendments settled questions. Most Americans shared a roughly similar understanding of the phrase "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist"; proslavery Americans hated the idea, and antislavery Americans celebrated it. The Thirteenth Amendment settled that question. The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise settled a major question. But the provision that that no state shall abridge the "privileges or immunities of citizens" was to forbid something that no major politician or judge ever embraced. The real point in dispute had been the very meaning of "privileges and immunities of citizens."
Nor was this issue effectively settled by the war. To be sure, the proslavery, absolute-rights reading effectively died, but the two other interpretations-both the Republican and the interstate-equality reading-survived. While the Republican reading no doubt prevailed among the members of Congress and state legislators who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, the interstate-equality reading probably still was dominant in the judiciarywhere Republicans had far, far less dominance. Further, even Republican judges were likely resistant to the Republican political interpretation, for it had been born of decidedly partisan, even sectional passions, and to that extent, may have appeared improper and unreliable to a judicious temperament. Moreover, the weight of precedent seemed to support the apparently simple, moderate, and equitable interstate-equality understanding. The best precedent for the Republican position, ironically, was the Chief Justice's opinion in Dred Scott, but that decision had been so thoroughly repudiated, especially by Republicans, that it no longer was much of a precedent at all. It was not surprising, then, that in deciding the meaning of "privileges and immunities of citizens" during Reconstruction, the Supreme Court looked not to the Republican Party platform of 1860 and other antislavery interpretations, and, of course, not to the pro-slavery interpretations. Rather, the Court, in an opinion drafted by Democrat Stephen Field, looked to the interstate-equality reading offered by the Democrat Judge Denio in the Lem-
